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On the Interference Alignment Designs
for Secure Multiuser MIMO Systems
Kha Hoang Ha, Thanh Tung Vu, Trung Quang Duong, and Nguyen-Son Vo
Abstract—In this paper, we propose two secure mul-
tiuser multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) transmission
approaches based on interference alignment (IA) in the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper. To deal with the information leakage
to the eavesdropper as well as the interference signals from
undesired transmitters (Txs) at desired receivers (Rxs), our
approaches aim to design the transmit precoding and receive
subspace matrices to minimize both the total inter-main-
link interference and the wiretapped signals (WSs). The first
proposed IA scheme focuses on aligning the WSs into proper
subspaces while the second one imposes a new structure on
the precoding matrices to force the WSs to zero. In each
proposed IA scheme, the precoding matrices and the receive
subspaces at the legitimate users are alternatively selected to
minimize the cost function of a convex optimization problem
for every iteration. We provide the feasible conditions and the
proofs of convergence for both IA approaches. The simulation
results indicate that our two IA approaches outperform the
conventional IA algorithm in terms of the average secrecy sum
rate.
Index Terms—Wiretap channels, secure communications,
interference alignment, MIMO multiuser, transceiver designs.
I. Introduction
Due to the broadcasting nature of wireless communi-
cations, the wireless data transmission among legitimate
users is susceptible to be wiretapped by nearby eaves-
droppers. Although cryptographic schemes at the network
layer seem to reach the security demands, they might not
be suitable for large networks, because of complex en-
cryption and decryption algorithms, key distribution and
management [1]. An alternative approach called physical
layer security (PLS) exploits the random characteristics
of wireless channels to achieve perfect secrecy without
requiring encryption keys. As such, PLS has received con-
siderable attention from the research community [2], [3],
[4]. Secure approaches for various contemporary systems
have been investigated, including MIMO systems [5], [6],
[7], [8], relaying systems [9], [10], heterogeneous and large-
scale networks [11], [12], [13], [14].
In multiuser multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO)
systems, various signal processing techniques can be ex-
ploited to enhance secrecy performance [15], [16], [17], [18],
[19], [20]. The authors in [15], [16], [17], [18] have generated
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the precoding matrices to directly maximize the secrecy
sum rate (SSR) of the network while the authors in [20],
[19] have designed the artificial noise properly to degrade
the received signals at the eavesdropper without causing
additional noise on the intended receiver (Rx). The solu-
tions in [20], [15], [16], [18], [19] address the optimization
problems of the SSR in the broadcast channels in which
only one base station communicates with multiple users in
the network. However, they do not study the problem of
multiple transmitter-receiver (Tx-Rx) pair transmissions.
It should be emphasized that the sum rate maximization of
the MIMO interference channels with multiple user pairs
is mathematically challenging even for the scenarios that
do not take secure transmission into consideration.
Recently, the degree of freedom (DoF) has been rec-
ognized as an important performance metric for MIMO
interference channels since it can characterize the system
capacity in the high signal-to-noise region. The achievable
DoFs can be obtained by interference alignment (IA)
[21], [22]. IA techniques have been applied to various
wireless networks such as cognitive radio, relay networks,
and multicell wireless networks ([23], [24], [25], [26] and
references therein) while only a limited amount of work
has exploited IA for secure multiuser MIMO transmissions
[27], [28]. In particular, the authors in [27] have proven
that it is possible for each user to achieve a nonzero secure
DoF by using an IA scheme. Reference [28] demonstrated
that the secure transmission is also possible when the
number of antennas at the legitimate Tx and Rx is
greater than that of the eavesdropper. However, a detailed
IA design for secure multisuer MIMO communication
networks has not been explored in [28]. Alternatively, the
authors in [29], [30] have exploited cooperative jamming
schemes with IA for secrecy communications.
The conventional IA technique has been well studied
in MIMO systems but not in a security context [21],
[31], [32], [22]. The authors in [21] proposed a scheme
which makes the Rxs free from inter-main-link-interference
(IMLI) by forcing IMLI into a reduced-dimensional sub-
space. However, closed-form solutions of the precoders
with more than 3 users appear to be critical. Hence,
iterative techniques have been investigated in [31], [32],
[22], in which the precoding matrices at the Txs and the
interference subspace matrices at the Rxs are alternatively
updated in each iteration. Compared with the scheme in
[21], the iterative algorithm is more general and applicable
for the interference channels with an arbitrary number
of Tx-Rx pairs. Motivated by these works, we adopt the
2iterative approach to our IA designs.
There are two typical scenarios of secrecy communica-
tions in multiuser MIMO wireless networks [27]. In the
first scenario, the secure communication networks involve
the passive or external eavesdroppers. In such networks,
CSI of wiretap channels is generally not available. The
second scenario is that some particular confidential in-
formation is not intended for particular users (namely
the eavesdroppers) in the networks. In such a case, all
users (including the eavesdroppers) belong to the same
network and, therefore, all CSI can be reasonably assumed
to be available for the secrecy strategy design [33], [34],
[35], [15], [16], [18], [27]. The present paper investigates
the secrecy communication with the multiple legitimate
users and one eavesdropper in the same network. Given
the global CSI, the focus of the paper is to design the
transmission strategies of the legitimate users to maximize
the secrecy capacity. In particular, we proposed two
IA schemes to reduce the information leakage at the
eavesdropper while keeping the legitimate Rxs free from
IMLI. Our IA designs reveal significant differences with
respect to the conventional IA design [32], as well as
provide system design guidelines to improve the secrecy.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows:
1) We propose the first IA scheme, referred to as a
wiretapped signal leakage minimization (WSLM)
method in which the legitimate users cooperatively
seek an optimal transmission strategy to minimize
both IMLI and the wiretapped signals in their
receive subspaces. The transmit precoding matrices
and the receive subspace matrices are alternatively
selected to monotonically reduce the cost function.
2) We propose the second IA scheme, namely a zero-
forcing wiretapped signal (ZFWS) scheme in which
the legitimate transmitters align their signals into
the null space of the channel matrices associated
with the eavesdropper while the IMLIs are min-
imized. By zero-forcing WSs at the eavesdropper,
the precoders are constructed by a cascade of two
precoding matrices in which one matrix is the null
space of the wiretap channel while the other matrix
is designed to satisfy the IA conditions for the
legitimate links.
3) We prove that our IA algorithms are converged. The
numerical results show that the proposed algorithms
are converged in less than 50 iterations. The feasible
conditions are also analyzed and showed that the
feasible condition for the ZFWS IA scheme is more
restrictive than that for the WSLM IA design. The
feasible conditions also imply that the secrecy of the
proposed system can be higher when increasing the
number of antennas at Txs and Rxs.
4) Simulation results indicate that the two proposed IA
designs outperform the conventional one in terms of
the SSR. The ZFWS IA provides the better SSR
improvement than the WSLM for the systems in
which the feasible conditions of both IA methods
are satisfied. However, if the feasible conditions of
the ZFWS IA are not satisfied, the ZFWS IA is
inferior to the WSLM scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the multiuser MIMO system in the presence of
an eavesdropper and reviews the conventional IA design.
In Section III, our IA algorithms are proposed. The
numerical results are provided in Section IV. Finally,
Section V presents concluding remarks.
Notation:X and x are respectively denoted as a complex
matrix and a vector. XT and XH are the transposition
and conjugate transposition of X , respectively. I and
0 are respectively identity and zero matrices with the
appropriate dimensions. tr(.), rank(.) and E(.) are the
trace, rank and expectation operators, respectively. ||X ||F
is the Frobenius norm. x ∼ CN (x¯,Rx) means that x is
a complex Gaussian random vector with means x¯ and
covariance Rx . X⊥ is denoted as the orthogonal subspace
of the subspace X .
Our preliminary results have been reported in confer-
ence papers [36], [37]. This paper presents a more complete
version of the work.
II. System Model and Conventional IA Design
A. System model of secure multiuser MIMO communica-
tion systems
We consider a secure multiuser MIMO communication
system as shown in Fig. 1. The system consists of K
Tx-Rx pairs in the presence of an eavesdropper (namely,
the (K + 1)-th receiver) trying to overhear information
from each Tx-Rx pair. The k-th Tx equipped with M
antennas sends d data streams to the k-th Rx equipped
with N antennas, where k ∈ K = {1, ...,K}. We con-
sider the flat-fading MIMO channels where the channel
matrix from the ℓ-th Tx to the k-th Rx is denoted as
H k,ℓ ∈ CN×M , and the channel matrix from the ℓ-th Tx
to the eavesdropper is denoted asHK+1,ℓ ∈ CNe×M , where
Ne is the number of antennas at the eavesdropper. The
channel entries are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) complex Gaussian variables and their magnitudes
follow the Rayleigh distribution. The channel is assumed
to be block-fading which remains unchanged for a frame
duration and varies independently for every frame. In
general, it is difficult to obtain CSI of wiretap channels in
the general secure communication networks involving the
passive or external eavesdroppers. However, obtaining CSI
for wiretap channels is possible for certain scenarios. One
scenario is that the eavesdropper is one of the legacy users
in the network and tries to access unauthorized services
[38], [17]. Another scenario is that the eavesdropper is
a subscribed user in the network but it is not intended
for particular confidential information [35]. Therefore, we
can assume that CSI of all main and wiretapped links is
known at all the legitimate users. This assumption has
been widely adopted in numerous related works; see [17],
3Fig. 1. A system model of secure multiuser MIMO communication
networks.
[27], [39], [33], [34], [35], [15], [16], [18] and references
therein.
In the multiuser MIMO system, the received signal yk ∈
CN×1 at the k-th Rx can be expressed as
yk =
∑
ℓ∈K
Hk,ℓF ℓxℓ + nk (1)
where xk ∈ C
d×1 is the signal vector transmitted from
the k-th Tx to the k-th Rx, F k ∈ CM×d is a precoding
matrix at the k-th Tx and nk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2kIN
)
is a complex
Gaussian noise vector at the k-th Rx. Without loss of
generality, we assume that E{xkxHk } = I d and, hence, the
channel capacity at the k-th legitimate Rx, for all k ∈ K,
can be computed as [40]
Rk = log2
∣∣IN +Hk,kF kFHk HHk,kR−1zk
∣∣ (2)
where Rzk =
∑
ℓ∈K\k
Hk,ℓF ℓF
H
ℓ H
H
k,ℓ + σ
2
kIN is the inter-
ference plus noise correlation matrix at the k-th receiver.
The eavesdropper (i.e., the (K + 1)-th Rx) wiretaps the
data signal from the k-th Tx-Rx pair and the rate of this
wiretap channel can be given by
R
(e)
k = log2
∣∣∣INe +HK+1,kF kFHk HHK+1,kR−1e,k
∣∣∣ (3)
where Re,k =
∑
ℓ∈K\k
HK+1,ℓF ℓF
H
ℓ H
H
K+1,ℓ + σ
2
K+1INe is
the interference and noise correlation matrix with respect
to the k-th desired signal at the eavesdropper. Now, the
secrecy rate for the k-th Tx-Rx pair can be defined as [14],
[17], [41]
RS,k = [Rk −R
(e)
k ]
+, (4)
where [a]+ = max(a, 0). Then, the secure DoF (SDoF) of
user k can be defined as [30], [29]
SDoFk = lim
Pt→∞
[
Rk −R
(e)
k
]+
log2(Pt)
= [dim(Wk)− dim(Ek)]
+
where Pt is the transmitted power which is assumed to
be the same at all the Txs; dim(Wk) is the dimension
of the receive interference-free subspace at the legitimate
receiver k while dim(Ek) is the dimension of the receive
interference-free subspace at the eavesdropper for wiretap-
ping the signal from user k. Accordingly, the SSR of the
multiuser MIMO system can be expressed as [17], [18]
RS =
∑
k∈K
RS,k =
∑
k∈K
[Rk −R
(e)
k ]
+, (5)
which can be rewritten as
RS = (
∑
k∈K
[dim(Wk)− dim(Ek)]
+) log2(Pt) + o(log2(Pt)).
(6)
Eq.(6) reveals the relationship between the SSR with the
dimensions of the receive subspaces. Thus, the focus of
our paper is to design the precoding and receive subspace
matrices to increase the dimension of the desired signal
subspace (by reducing the dimension of the interference
subspace) at each legitimate user while simultaneously
reducing the dimension of the wiretapped signal subspace.
B. Conventional IA design for multiuser MIMO commu-
nication systems
In the conventional IA schemes for interference channels
in [32], [22], there is no concern about the eavesdropper.
The aim of the conventional IA design is to select the
precoding {F k}
K
k=1 and the receiving matrices {W k}
K
k=1 to
ensure no IMLI and to fully recover d data streams at the
intended Rx k. Mathematically, {F k}Kk=1 and {W k}
K
k=1
satisfy the two following IA conditions
rank
(
WHk Hk,kF k
)
= d (7)
WHk Hk,ℓF ℓ = 0, ∀ℓ 6= k, ℓ ∈ K. (8)
Condition (7) guarantees that the intended signal at the
k-th Rx achieves d DoFs whenH k,k is full rank. Condition
(8) ensures no IMLI at the k-th Rx. To remove the
interference signals at the intended Rx k, the interference
signal Hk,ℓF ℓ is aligned into the interference subspace Uk
which is spanned by U k and orthogonal with the receiving
signal subspace Wk spanned by W k. Mathematically, the
concept of matrix distance between a matrix A and an
orthonormal matrix U is defined as ||A −UUHA||2
F
[32].
Hence, the total interference leakage can be expressed as
Jconvt({F k}
K
k=1, {U k}
K
k=1) =
K∑
k=1
K∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=k
||H k,ℓF ℓ −U kU
H
k H k,ℓF ℓ||
2
F
. (9)
Finally, the IA problem can be mathematically posed as
min
{F k}Kk=1,{Uk}
K
k=1
Jconvt({F k}
K
k=1, {U k}
K
k=1) (10a)
s.t. FHk F k =
Pt
d
I ; ∀k ∈ K (10b)
UHk U k = I ; ∀k ∈ K. (10c)
4The solution of the conventional IA problem in (10) is
solved via an alternating algorithm as follows [32]
Transmitter precoding design: By holding {U k}
K
k=1
fixed, the total interference at the k-th Rx in (9) is mini-
mized with the proper precoders {F k}
K
k=1. The precoders
{F k}
K
k=1 are selected by solving the following optimization
problem
min
F ℓ
tr{FHℓ (
∑
k∈K\ℓ
HHk,ℓ(I −U kU
H
k )H k,ℓ)F ℓ} (11a)
s.t. FHℓ F ℓ =
Pt
d
I . (11b)
Then, the optimal solution F ℓ is given by [42].
F ℓ =
√
Pt
d
ζdmin{
∑
k∈K\ℓ
HHk,ℓ(I −U kU
H
k )H k,ℓ} (12)
where ζdmin {X} is the matrix whose columns are the d
eigenvectors corresponding to the d smallest eigenvalues
of X .
Receiver interference subspace selection: When F ℓ is
fixed, the orthonormal basis matrix U k at the legitimate
Rx k is selected to ensure that most of interference falls
into the interference subspace Uk spanned by U k. In terms
of the matrix variable U k, the optimization problem (10)
can be recasted as
max
U k
tr{UHk (
∑
ℓ∈K\k
H k,ℓF ℓF
H
ℓ H
H
k,ℓ)U k} (13a)
s.t. UHk U k = I . (13b)
Hence, U k can be given by [42]
U k = ζ
N−d
max {
∑
ℓ∈K\k
H k,ℓF ℓF
H
ℓ H
H
k,ℓ} (14)
where ζN−dmax {X} is the matrix whose columns are the
(N − d) dominant eigenvectors of matrix X .
It is worth noting that the conventional IA only aims
at minimizing the total interference leakage which falls
into a desired signal subspace in the insecure context. In
the next section, we proposed two IA schemes for secure
multiuser MIMO communications. The objective is not
only to minimize the total interference leakage at the
intended receivers but also to minimize the information
bearing signal leakage at the eavesdropper. In addition, we
derive the conditions on the number of users and antennas
to guarantee the feasibility of secrecy communications.
III. Interference Alignment for Secure Multiuser MIMO
Communication Systems
In this section, we propose two IA schemes for secure
multiuser MIMO communication systems. In addition
to satisfying the conventional IA requirements for the
legitimate users, the proposed schemes impose additional
constraints to enhance the SSR. The first IA scheme,
known as WSLM, aims to align all the information signals
into a reduced dimensional subspace at the eavesdropper
while the second one nulls out the signals at the eaves-
dropper.
A. WSLM for secrecy multiuser MIMO communication
systems
To degrade the wiretap channel capacity, the underlay-
ing idea is to align the signals from the legitimate users
into a lower dimensional subspace at the eavesdropper.
Similar to the conventional IA design, to remove the
interference at the intended Rx k, we also align the
interference signal Hk,ℓF ℓ into the interference subspace
W⊥k which is spanned by the orthonormal basis matrix U k.
Hence, the total interference leakage inside the receiving
subspace at the legitimate Rxs is defined by
J1({F k}
K
k=1, {U k}
K
k=1)
=
∑
k∈K
∑
ℓ∈K\k
||H k,ℓF ℓ −U kU
H
k Hk,ℓF ℓ||
2
F
=
∑
k=∈K
∑
ℓ∈K\k
tr
{
FHℓ H
H
k,ℓ(I −U kU
H
k )H k,ℓF ℓ
}
. (15)
Note that the legitimate users do not have the knowledge
of the wiretapped signal subspaces Ek. To reduce the
wiretapped information for all users, the legitimate users
cooperatively seek a smallest dimensional subspace E at
the eavesdropper in which the signals are most aligned.
Assume that the subspace E at the eavesdropper is
spanned by the orthonormal basis matrix UK+1. It should
be emphasized that E is appropriately selected by the
legitimate transmitters. It is a subspace that all the signals
can be most superimposed each other. The eavesdropper’s
receiver is not necessary to rely on E . Mathematically, we
aim to minimize
J2({F k}
K
k=1,UK+1)
=
K∑
k=1
||HK+1,ℓF ℓ −UK+1U
H
K+1HK+1,ℓF ℓ||
2
F
=
K∑
ℓ=1
tr
{
FHℓ H
H
K+1,ℓ(I −UK+1U
H
K+1)HK+1,ℓF ℓ
}
. (16)
Then, the total signal leakage can be defined as
J({F k}
K
k=1, {U k}
K+1
k=1 ) =
J1({F k}
K
k=1, {U k}
K
k=1) + J2({F k}
K
k=1,UK+1). (17)
Accordingly, the IA problem can be expressed as the
following joint optimization problem
min
{F k}Kk=1,{Uk}
K+1
k=1
J({F k}
K
k=1, {U k}
K+1
k=1 ) (18a)
s.t. FHk F k =
Pt
d
I ; ∀k ∈ K (18b)
UHk U k = I ; ∀k ∈ K ∪ {K + 1}. (18c)
We now derive the solution of problem (18) via alter-
nating minimization [32]. First, the variables {U k}
K+1
k=1
are temporarily fixed, the objective function can be opti-
mized with the variables {F k}Kk=1 and, then, we alternate
between the two set of variables. Specifically, the key ideas
in our proposed algorithm are explained in the following.
Transmitter precoding design: Firstly, the k-th Tx
adjusts F k to guarantee the interference signal falling
5into the interference subspace Uk at the k-th Rx. When
{U k}
K+1
k=1 are fixed, for finding optimal F ℓ, problem (18)
equivalently reduces to
min
F ℓ
tr{FHℓ (
K+1∑
k=1,k 6=ℓ
HHk,ℓ(I −U kU
H
k )H k,ℓ)F ℓ} (19a)
s.t. FHℓ F ℓ =
Pt
d
I ; ∀ℓ ∈ K. (19b)
The solution to problem (19) is given by [42]
F ℓ =
√
Pt
d
ζdmin{
K+1∑
k=1,k 6=ℓ
HHk,ℓ(I −U kU
H
k )H k,ℓ}. (20)
Receiver interference subspace selection: Secondly, when
F ℓ is fixed, similar to the conventional IA design, the
orthonormal basis matrix U k at the legitimate Rx k is
selected for each Rx k as in (14). To deal with wiretapped
signals, we define E⊥ spanned by an orthonormal matrix
E ∈ Ne×n as an orthogonal subspace of the subspace
E . Since E is an orthonormal basis matrix, rank (E) =
rank
(
EH
)
= n. The design of interest is to align the
signals into the subspace E and, thus, we have the following
conditions
EHHK+1,ℓF ℓ = 0, ℓ ∈ K. (21)
That is, HK+1,ℓF ℓ ∈ CNe×d must lie in the null space
of EH . Hence, the existence condition of EH is Ne −
n ≥ d. Thus, we consider the case that n = Ne − d for
the dimension of the null space of EH to be smallest, to
make the eavesdropper harder to recover signals 1. Then,
the matrix size of UK+1 must be Ne × d. From (16),
the orthonormal basis UK+1 can be found by solving the
following optimization problem
max
UK+1
tr{UHK+1(
∑
ℓ∈K
HK+1,ℓF ℓF
H
ℓ H
H
K+1,ℓ)UK+1} (22a)
s.t. UHK+1UK+1 = Id. (22b)
The solution to (22) can be found as follows [42]
UK+1 = ζ
d
max{
∑
ℓ∈K
HK+1,ℓF ℓF
H
ℓ H
H
K+1,ℓ}. (23)
The step-by-step iterative algorithm for the WSLM
method can be shown in Algorithm 1.
Convergence analysis for the WSLM IA design: The
convergence of the proposed WSLM IA scheme can be
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The proposed WSLM IA in Algorithm
1 for secure multiuser MIMO communication networks
converges monotonically.
Proof 1: In the κ-th iteration, by holding {U
(κ)
k }
K+1
k=1
fixed, in step 5, the optimal solution {F
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1 obtained
1Note that different from the conventional IA scheme in which
the receive subspace is tightly related to its corresponding receiver,
the subspace E herein is selected by the legitimate users and is not
related to the eavesdropper’s receiver. The aim of the legitimate users
is to find the subspace E such that their signals can be most aligned
into the subspace E without regarding the eavesdropper’s receiver.
Algorithm 1 : Proposed WSLM IA Algorithm for Secure
Multiuser MIMO Systems
1: Inputs: d,H k,ℓ, ∀k ∈ K ∪ {K + 1}, ∀ℓ ∈ K, κ = 0,
κmax, where κ is the iteration index;
2: Initial variables: random matrix {F
(0)
k }
K
k=1 satisfied
F
(0)H
k F
(0)
k =
√
Pt
d
Id; then select {U
(0)
k }
K+1
k=1 from (14)
and (23);
3: Evaluate the objective function
J({F
(0)
k }
K
k=1, {U
(0)
k }
K+1
k=1 ) from (18);
4: while κ < κmax do
5: For fixed {U
(κ)
k }
K+1
k=1 , select {F
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1 from (20);
6: For fixed {F
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1, select {U
(κ+1)
k }
K+1
k=1 from
(14) and (23);
7: Evaluate the objective function
J({F
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1, {U
(κ+1)
k }
K+1
k=1 ) from (18);
8: κ = κ+ 1;
9: Repeat steps 5-8 until convergence.
10: end while
from (20) minimizes J({F k}Kk=1, {U
(κ)
k }
K+1
k=1 ) in (18) and,
thus,
J({F
(κ+1)
k , {U
(κ)
k }) ≤ J({F
(κ)
k }, {U
(κ)
k }). (24)
Next, in step 6, by holding {F
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1 fixed, the opti-
mal solution {U
(κ+1)
k }
K+1
k=1 obtained from (14) minimizes
J({F
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1, {U k}
K+1
k=1 ), i.e.,
J({F
(κ+1)
k }, {U
(κ+1)
k }) ≤ J({F
(κ+1)
k }, {U
(κ)
k }). (25)
The combination of Eqs. (24) and (25) yields
J({F
(κ+1)
k }, {U
(κ+1)
k }) ≤ J({F
(κ)
k }, {U
(κ)
k }). (26)
That is, the cost function J in (18) is reduced mono-
tonically over iteration. In addtion, the cost function is
bounded below by zero. Thus, the convergence of the first
proposed IA algorithm is guaranteed.
Feasible condition for the proposed WSLM IA design:
The feasibility of the IA scheme is tightly related to the
properness of the system [43]. The MIMO interference
channels are known as proper systems as the number of
variables Nv is greater than or equal to the number of
equations Neq in the IA conditions (8) and (21). The
proper systems surely render the feasibility of the IA
problems. To count Neq and Nv, we rewrite Eq. (8) and
(21) as follows
w
[i]H
k Hk,ℓf
[j]
ℓ = 0; ∀ℓ 6= k, ℓ ∈ K, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ K (27)
e[m]HHK+1,ℓf
[j]
ℓ = 0; ∀ℓ ∈ K, ∀m ∈M, ∀j ∈ K (28)
where f
[j]
ℓ , and w
[i]
k , e
[m] is the transmit beamforming
vectors and column vectors of basis matrices at the Tx,
Rx, and eavesdropper, respectively, with I = {1, . . . , d}
and M = {1, . . . , Ne−d}. In the proposed IA design, Neq
is directly given from (27) and (28) as follows
Neq = K(K − 1)d
2 +K(Ne − d)d. (29)
6The number of variables designed for any precoder or
subspace matrix V ∈ Cm×n is proven to be equal to n(m−
n) [43]. Hence, the number of variables to be designed for
precoderF ℓ, subspace matricesW k andE equals d(M−d),
d(N − d) and d(Ne − d), respectively. Finally, the total
number of variables in the proposed IA conditions (27)
and (28) can be given as
Nv = Kd (M +N − 2d) + d(Ne − d). (30)
Denote (M ×N,Ne, d)
K
as the system where there are
K Tx-Rx pairs and one eavesdropper; the Tx, Rx and
eavesdropper are respectively equipped with M , N , Ne
antennas; and d data streams are sent between each Tx-
Rx pair. The feasible condition for the proposed IA design
in secure communications can be stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: The IA scheme in Algorithm 1 for the
(M ×N,Ne, d)
K system with secure communication is
feasible if Nv ≥ Neq, i.e.,
K(M +N)−
(
K2 + 1
)
d ≥ Ne(K − 1). (31)
Proof 2: By comparing Neq in (29) and Nv in (30), one
can easily obtain (31).
Remark 1: Theorem 2 implies that for satisfying the
WSLM IA feasible conditions, the number of antennas at
the eavesdropper is restricted by Ne ≤
K(M+N)−(K2+1)d
K−1 .
Since the number of antennas at the eavesdropper cannot
be controlled in the proposed system, the secrecy can
be enhanced when increasing the number of transceiver
antennas M and N .
B. ZFWS based IA design for secure multiuser MIMO
systems
In this subsection, we propose an IA design to force
the information leakage to zero at the eavesdropper while
keeping two conventional IA conditions in (7) and (8)
satisfied. Condition (21) can be rewritten as a zero-
information-leakage constraint
HK+1,ℓF ℓ = 0, ∀ℓ ∈ K. (32)
From Eq. (32), we use a zero-forcing method to cancel all
received signals at the eavesdropper. The key idea is to
find the precoding matrices F ℓ to force all the receiving
signals to zero at the eavesdropper. It means that F ℓ is
the null space of HK+1,ℓ. To this end, we calculate the
singular value decomposition (SVD) of HK+1,ℓ as
HK+1,ℓ = ΦℓΣℓΞ
H
ℓ (33)
where Σℓ is the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
being singular values in decreasing order. For the existence
of F ℓ satisfying Eq. (32), we must haveM−Ne ≥ d. Define
∆ℓ ∈ CM×d as the matrix of the last d columns in the
matrix Ξℓ, i.e.,∆ℓ lies on the null space ofHK+1,ℓ. Hence,
the precoder matrix F ℓ is defined as F ℓ = ∆ℓP ℓ, where
P ℓ ∈ Cd×d is an arbitrary matrix. The total interference
leakage J in (9) can be rewritten as
J({P k}
K
k=1, {U k}
K
k=1) =∑
k∈K
∑
ℓ∈K\k
||H k,ℓ∆ℓP ℓ −U kU
H
k H k,ℓ∆ℓP ℓ||
2
F
. (34)
Then, the IA problem can be expressed as an optimization
problem
min
{P k}Kk=1,{Uk}
K
k=1
J({P k}
K
k=1, {U k}
K
k=1) (35a)
s.t. PHk P k =
Pt
d
I ∀k ∈ K (35b)
UHk U k = I ; ∀k ∈ K. (35c)
We now derive the solution of problem (35) via alternating
minimization as follows [32].
Transmitter precoding design: The interference leakage
power in (34) can be reformulated as
J =
∑
k∈K
∑
ℓ∈K\k
tr
{
PHℓ ∆
H
ℓ H
H
k,ℓ(I −U kU
H
k )H k,ℓ∆ℓP ℓ
}
.
(36)
By holding {U k}Kk=1 fixed, we select the power alloca-
tion matrix P ℓ as the optimal solution of the following
optimization problem
min
P ℓ
tr{PHℓ (
∑
k∈K\ℓ
∆Hℓ H
H
k,ℓ(I −U kU
H
k )H k,ℓ∆ℓ)P ℓ} (37a)
s.t. PHℓ P ℓ =
Pt
d
I , (37b)
which results in
P ℓ =
√
Pt
d
ζdmin{
∑
k∈K\ℓ
∆Hℓ H
H
k,ℓ(I −U kU
H
k )H k,ℓ∆ℓ}. (38)
Receiver interference subspace selection: Now, {P ℓ}
K
ℓ=1
is hold fixed, the orthonormal basis matrix U k at the
legitimate Rx k is selected for each Rx k to ensure that
most of interference falls into the interference subspace
Uk spanned by U k. In order to minimize the interference
signals in J in (34), the matrix distance minimization
problem is equivalent to
max
Uk
tr{UHk (
∑
ℓ∈K\k
Hk,ℓ∆ℓP ℓP
H
ℓ ∆
H
ℓ H
H
k,ℓ)U k} (39a)
s.t. UHk U k = I . (39b)
Hence, the solution of (39) can be obtained by [42], given
as below
U k = ζ
N−d
max {
∑
ℓ∈K\k
Hk,ℓ∆ℓP ℓP
H
ℓ ∆
H
ℓ H
H
k,ℓ}. (40)
The step-by-step iterative algorithm for the ZFWS IA
scheme is shown in Algorithm 2.
Convergence analysis for the ZFWS IA design: The
convergence of the second IA scheme is presented in the
following theorem.
7Algorithm 2 : Proposed ZFWS IA Algorithm for Secure
Multiuser MIMO Systems
1: Inputs: d,H k,ℓ, ∀k, ℓ ∈ K, κ = 0, κmax where κ is the
iteration index;
2: Evaluate ∆ℓ by choosing the last d columns of Ξℓ in
(33), ∀ℓ ∈ K;
3: Initial variables: Set {U
(0)
k }
K
k=1 are identity matrices;
then select {P
(0)
k }
K
k=1 from (38);
4: Evaluate the objective function
J({P
(0)
k }
K
k=1, {U
(0)
k }
K
k=1) from (36);
5: while κ < κmax do
6: For fixed {P
(κ)
k }
K
k=1, select {U
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1 from (40);
7: For fixed {U
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1, select {P
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1 from
(38);
8: Evaluate the objective function
J({P
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1, {U
(κ+1)
k }
K
k=1) from (36);
9: κ = κ+ 1;
10: Repeat steps 6-9 until convergence.
11: end while
Theorem 3: The proposed ZFWS IA algorithm for se-
cure multiuser MIMO communication networks converges
monotonically.
Proof 3: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and,
thus, omitted.
Feasible condition for the ZFWS IA scheme: Similar to
the WSLM IA scheme, the feasibility of the ZFWS IA
scheme relies on the number of the variables and that of
the equations. The properness of the second IA design is
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The feasible condition of the proposed
ZFWS IA algorithm for secure multiuser MIMO commu-
nication networks is M − d ≥ Ne and N ≥ Kd.
Proof 4: First,M−d ≥ Ne is the necessary condition for
the existence of F ℓ satisfying condition (32). Exploiting
the structure of the precoding matrix F ℓ =∆ℓP ℓ and re-
moving superfluous variables [44], the number of variables
and equations in the IA condition (8) are Nv = K(N−d)d
andNeq = K(K−1)d
2, respectively. The feasible condition
is given by Nv ≥ Neq which results in N ≥ Kd.
Remark 2: We now compare the constraints on the
number of antennas required for proper systems of the
proposed IA schemes. Since the feasible condition of the
ZFWS IA design is N ≥ Kd, the feasible condition of the
WSLM IA design (31) can be rewritten as
KM − d
K − 1
≤
K(M +N)− (K2 + 1)d
K − 1
, ∀N ≥ Kd. (41)
It is noted that
KM − d
K − 1
> M − d; ∀K ≥ 2. (42)
Hence, from (41) and (42), we have
K(M +N)− (K2 + 1)d
K − 1
> M − d,
∀K ≥ 2, ∀N ≥ Kd. (43)
It means that the upper bound of Ne in the WSLM IA
design is always higher than that of the ZFWS IA design.
IV. Illustrative Results
In this section, we evaluate the SSR performance of our
two proposed IA designs through several numerical results,
in comparison with the conventional IA algorithm [32]. In
simulations, noise variances are normalized σ2k = σ
2 = 1.
The Rayleigh fading channel coefficients are generated
from the complex Gaussian distribution CN (0, 1). We
define signal-to-noise-ratio SNR = Pt
σ2
. All the numerical
results are averaged over the 200 channel realizations.
First, we investigate the convergence characteristic of
the two proposed IA algorithms. We run the simulation
for (9× 9, 6, 3)3 and (6× 6, 4, 2)3 systems with a random
channel realization. Note that both systems are satisfied
the feasible conditions in Theorems 2 and 4. The evolution
of the cost functions (SSR) over iterations is illustrated in
Fig. 2. As can been seen from Fig. 2, the cost functions
reduce monotonically over iterations and approach to zero.
The second proposed IA design converges very fast in
just few iterations while the first proposed IA design
takes around 25 iterations such that the objective value
converges to 10−9.
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Fig. 2. The convergence behavior of the proposed IA algorithms.
Now, we compare the SSR of our two proposed IA
algorithms with that of the conventional IA method [32]
which does not involve the secrecy constraints. First,
we consider 4 scenarios of (9× 9, 6, 3)3 , (9× 9, 9, 3)3,
(15× 15, 9, 3)3 and (15× 15, 18, 3)3 systems. It should be
noted that the WSLM IA feasible condition is satisfied
in all of these systems but only the (9× 9, 6, 3)3 and
(15× 15, 9, 3)3 systems satisfy the feasible conditions for
the ZFWS IA scheme while the other systems do not. It
has been revealed from Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 that for the
(9× 9, 6, 3)3 and (15× 15, 9, 3)3 systems, the ZFWS IA
scheme outperforms the WSLM IA one.
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Fig. 3. The average SSR versus SNR for (9× 9, 6, 3)3 and
(9× 9, 9, 3)3 systems.
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Fig. 4. The average SSR versus SNR for (15 × 15, 9, 3)3 and
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However, note that the constraint on the number of
antennas at the eavesdropper in the ZFWS IA method
is more restrictive than that of WSLM IA scheme. Thus,
the (9× 9, 9, 3)3 and (15× 15, 18, 3)3 systems do not meet
the feasible condition of the ZFWS IA scheme while still
satisfying the feasible condition of the WSLM IA scheme.
In two these configurations, the SSRs of the WSLM IA
scheme are higher than the SSRs of the ZFWS IA one. It
is also important to observe from Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 that
both proposed IA designs significantly improve the SSR
in comparison with the conventional IA design.
Finally, we investigate the SSR improvement of two
proposed IA design in comparison with the conventional
IA design versus various number of antennas at the
eavesdropper (Ne). We define the average SSR improve-
ment of each proposed IA design in comparison with the
conventional IA design as follows
RImpS =
1
NR
NR∑
n=1
[
RIAproposedS −R
IAconventional
S
]
(44)
where NR is the number of channel realizations,
RIAproposedS and R
IAconventional
S are the SSRs of our
proposed IA designs and the conventional IA design, re-
spectively. Fig. 5 illustrates the average SSR improvements
of two proposed IA designs in the (9× 9, Ne, 3)
3
and
(15× 15, Ne, 3)
3
systems with SNR = 30 dB. It can be
observed that the SSR improvement is not significant as
Ne is too low or too high. The reasons for this, are that,
when Ne is high, the feasible conditions for IA schemes
are not satisfied and, then, the secure communication is
not feasible. On the other hand, when Ne is low, the
rate of wiretap channels is negligible and, thus, the SSR
improvement is not significant. Additionally, Fig. 5 also
reveals that the ZFWS IA scheme offers the better SSR
improvement than the WSLM IA method as the feasible
condition of the ZFWS IA is satisfied. These results give
an instruction for selecting an appropriate IA approach
for given system parameters to gain the best secrecy.
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Fig. 5. The average SSR improvement versus the number of antennas
at the eavesdropper for (9× 9, Ne, 3)
3 and (15× 15, Ne, 3)
3 systems.
V. Conclusion
We have designed two IA schemes to enhance the
secrecy of multiuser MIMO communication systems
in flat-fading channels. Our two IA approaches have
been designed to minimize the IMLI at all Rxs and
the WSs at the eavesdropper by properly choosing the
transmit precoding and receiving subspace matrices at
the legitimate users. Our analysis provides key insights
into the two proposed IA designs over the proof of
convergence and feasible conditions. Although each
proposed IA approach has its own advantages and
9disadvantages based on feasible conditions over the
number of antennas at the eavesdropper, both proposed
IA methods demonstrate significant SSR improvements
in comparison with the conventional IA method.
Acknowledgments
This research is funded by Vietnam National Founda-
tion for Science and Technology Development (NAFOS-
TED) under grant number 102.04-2013.46.
References
[1] A. Mukherjee, S. A. Fakoorian, J. Huang, and A. L. Swindle-
hurst, “Principles of physical layer security in multiuser wireless
networks: A survey,” IEEE Commun. Surveys & Tutorials,
vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1550–1573, 2014.
[2] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical-Layer Security: From Infor-
mation Theory to Security Engineering. Cambridge Univ. Pr.,
2011.
[3] X. Zhou, L. Song, and Y. Zhang, Physical Layer Security in
Wireless Communications. CRC Pr., 2013.
[4] W. Trappe, “The challenges facing physical layer security,” IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 16–20, Jun. 2015.
[5] X. Zhang, M. McKay, X. Zhou, and R. Heath, “Artificial-noise-
aided secure multi-antenna transmission with limited feedback,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 2742–2754,
May 2015.
[6] X. Zhang, X. Zhou, and M. R. McKay, “Enhancing secrecy with
multiantenna transmission in wireless ad hoc networks,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Foren. Sec., vol. 8, no. 11, pp. 1802–1814, Nov. 2013.
[7] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO
wiretap channel,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inform. Theory,
Toronto, Canada, Jul. 2008, pp. 524–528.
[8] A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Jamming games in the
MIMO wiretap channel with an active eavesdropper,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 82–91, Jan. 2013.
[9] X. Chen, C. Zhong, C. Yuen, and H. H. Chen, “Multi-antenna
relay aided wireless physical layer security,” IEEE Commun.
Mag., vol. 53, no. 12, pp. 40–46, Dec. 2015.
[10] R. Zhang, L. Song, Z. Han, and B. Jiao, “Physical layer security
for two-way untrusted relaying with friendly jammers,” IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 3693–3704, Oct. 2012.
[11] N. Yang, L. Wang, G. Geraci, M. Elkashlan, J. Yuan, and M. D.
Renzo, “Safeguarding 5G wireless communication networks us-
ing physical layer security,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 4,
pp. 20–27, Apr. 2015.
[12] P. C. Pinto, J. Barros, and M. Z. Win, “Secure communication
in stochastic wireless networks - part I: Connectivity,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Foren. Sec., vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 125–138, Feb. 2012.
[13] X. Zhou, R. K. Ganti, J. G. Andrews, and A. Hjorungnes, “On
the throughput cost of physical layer security in decentralized
wireless networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10,
no. 8, pp. 2764–2775, Aug. 2011.
[14] T. Lv, H. Gao, and S. Yang, “Secrecy transmit beamforming for
heterogeneous networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33,
no. 6, pp. 1154–1170, Jun. 2015.
[15] M. Hanif, L.-N. Tran, M. Juntti, and S. Glisic, “On linear
precoding strategies for secrecy rate maximization in multiuser
multiantenna wireless networks,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 62, no. 14, pp. 3536–3551, Jul. 2014.
[16] N. Yang, G. Geraci, J. Yuan, and R. Malaney, “Confidential
broadcasting via linear precoding in non-homogeneous MIMO
multiuser networks,” IEEE Trans. Commun,, vol. 62, no. 7, pp.
2515–2530, Jul. 2014.
[17] T. Lv, H. Gao, R. Cao, and J. Zhou, “Co-ordinated secure
beamforming in K -user interference channel with multiple
eavesdroppers,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Letters, vol. 5, no. 2,
pp. 212–215, Apr. 2016.
[18] G. Geraci, M. Egan, J. Yuan, A. Razi, and I. Collings, “Secrecy
sum-rates for multi-user MIMO regularized channel inversion
precoding,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 60, no. 11, pp. 3472–
3482, Nov. 2012.
[19] A. Mukherjee and A. Swindlehurst, “Utility of beamforming
strategies for secrecy in multiuser MIMO wiretap channels,” in
Proc. IEEE. 47th Annual Allerton Conf. Commun. Control and
Computing, NJ, USA, Sep. 2009, pp. 1134–1141.
[20] J. Yang, I.-M. Kim, and D. I. Kim, “Optimal cooperative
jamming for multiuser broadcast channel with multiple eaves-
droppers,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 6, pp.
2840–2852, Jun. 2013.
[21] V. R. Cadambe and S. A. Jafar, “Interference alignment and
degrees of freedom of the-user interference channel,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 3425–3441, 2008.
[22] D. Papailiopoulos and A. Dimakis, “Interference alignment as
a rank constrained rank minimization,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 60, no. 8, pp. 4278–4288, Aug. 2012.
[23] H. Du, T. Ratnarajah, H. Zhou, and Y. C. Liang, “Interference
alignment for peer-to-peer underlay MIMO cognitive radio
network,” in Proc. IEEE Asilomar Conf. Signal. Syst. and
Comput. (ACSSC), CA, USA, Nov. 2011, pp. 349–353.
[24] X. Chen, S. Song, and K. Letaief, “Interference alignment in
dual-hop MIMO interference channel,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 1274–1283, Mar. 2014.
[25] R. Zhou, T. Lv, W. Long, H. Gao, Y. Lu, and E. Liu, “Limited
feedback schemes based on inter-cell interference alignment in
two-cell interfering MIMO-MAC,” in 2013 IEEE Int. Conf.
Commun. (ICC), Jun. 2013, pp. 5214–5218.
[26] H. Gao, T. Lv, D. Fang, S. Yang, and C. Yuen, “Limited
feedback-based interference alignment for interfering multi-
access channels,” IEEE Commun. Letters, vol. 18, no. 4, pp.
540–543, Apr. 2014.
[27] O. Koyluoglu, H. El Gamal, L. Lai, and H. Poor, “Interference
alignment for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory., vol. 57,
no. 6, pp. 3323–3332, Jun. 2011.
[28] S. Sasaki, T. Shimizu, H. Iwai, and H. Sasaoka, “Secure com-
munications using interference alignment in MIMO interference
channels,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Antenna. Propagat., Oct.
2012, pp. 762–765.
[29] L. Ruan, V. K. N. Lau, and M. Z. Win, “Generalized interference
alignment–part II: Application to wireless secrecy,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 64, no. 10, pp. 2688–2701, May 2016.
[30] J. H. Lee and W. Choi, “Multiuser diversity for secrecy com-
munications using opportunistic jammer selection: Secure DoF
and jammer scaling law,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 62,
no. 4, pp. 828–839, Feb. 2014.
[31] K. R. Kumar and F. Xue, “An iterative algorithm for joint
signal and interference alignment,” in IEEE Int. Symp. Inform.
Theory, no. EPFL-CONF-172017, NJ, USA, 2010, pp. 2293–
2297.
[32] S. W. Peters and R. W. Heath, “Interference alignment via
alternating minimization,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Acoust.
Speech. Signal Process. (ICASSP), Taipeo, Taiwan, Apr. 2009,
pp. 2445–2448.
[33] S. Shafiee, N. Liu, and S. Ulukus, “Towards the secrecy capacity
of the gaussian MIMO wire-tap channel: The 2-2-1 channel,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 4033–4039,
Sep. 2009.
[34] A. Khisti and G. W.Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple
antennas I: The MISOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, vol. 56, no. 7, pp. 3088–3104, Jul. 2010.
[35] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO
wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8,
pp. 4961–4972, Aug. 2011.
[36] T. T. Vu, H. H. Kha, T. Q. Duong, and N. S. Vo, “Wiretapped
signal leakage minimization for secure multiuser MIMO systems
via interference alignment,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Advanced
Technologies for Communications (ATC), Oct. 2015, pp. 79–83.
[37] T. T. Vu, H. H. Kha, and T. Q. Duong, “Interference alignment
designs for secure multiuser MIMO systems: rank constrained
rank minimization approach,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Com-
mun. Management and Telecommun. (ComManTel), Dec. 2015,
pp. 116–121.
[38] Q. Li and W. K. Ma, “Optimal and robust transmit designs
for MISO channel secrecy by semidefinite programming,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 59, no. 8, pp. 3799–3812, Aug. 2011.
10
[39] S. Fakoorian and A. Swindlehurst, “MIMO interference chan-
nel with confidential messages: Achievable secrecy rates and
precoder design,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Forensics and Security,
vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 640–649, Sept 2011.
[40] S. Bazzi, G. Dietl, and W. Utschick, “Interference alignment
via minimization projector distances of interfering subspaces,”
in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Signal Process. Advances in Wireless
Commun. (SPAWC), Cesme, Turkey, Jun. 2012, pp. 274–287.
[41] Z. Kong, S. Yang, F. Wu, S. Peng, L. Zhong, and L. Hanzo,
“Iterative distributed minimum total MSE approach for secure
communications in MIMO interference channels,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 594–608, Mar.
2016.
[42] H. Lütkepohl, Handbook of Matrices. Wiley, 1997.
[43] C. Yetis, T. Gou, S. Jafar, and A. Kayran, “On feasibility of
interference alignment in MIMO interference networks,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 58, no. 9, pp. 4771–4782, Sept 2010.
[44] C. M. Yetis, T. Gou, S. A. Jafar, and A. H. Kayran, “Feasibility
conditions for interference alignment,” in Proc. IEEE Conf.
Global Telecommun. (GLOBECOM), Hawaii, USA, Dec. 2009,
pp. 1–6.
